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161 
OKLAHOMA’S SAVE OUR STATE AMENDMENT: 
TWO ISSUES FOR THE APPEAL 
JOHN T. PARRY∗ 
In November 2010, 70% of Oklahoma voters approved the “Save Our 
State Amendment,” a referendum that was drafted and referred to the voters 
by the state legislature.1   
The primary purpose of the amendment was to add the following 
language to article VII, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution: 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when 
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the 
law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the 
Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and 
if necessary the law of another state of the United States 
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, 
in making judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to the 
legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the 
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.  The 
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first 
impression.2 
Almost immediately, the executive director of the Oklahoma chapter of 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations filed suit in federal district 
court to block the amendment.3  The court agreed with the plaintiff’s 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause claims and entered a preliminary 
injunction against certification of the election results for the amendment on 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.  My thanks to Bill Funk, Jenny 
Logan, and Ruth Miller for their help with this essay. 
 1. Summary Results: General Election – November 2, 2010, OKLA. STATE ELECTION 
BD., http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).  The 
Oklahoma Constitution authorizes legislative referenda as part of its broader initiative and 
referendum provisions.  See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
 2. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok. 
gov/documents/legislation/52nd/2010/2R/HJ/1056.pdf. 
 3. State Question 755 Resource, COUNSEL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, OKLA., 
http://ok.cair. com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=353&Itemid=186 (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
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November 29, 2010.4  Although the plaintiff challenged only the 
amendment’s references to “Sharia Law,”5 the injunction against 
certification prevents any of the amendment from going into effect. 
The state’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit is pending.  Oral argument was 
held on September 12, 2011.6 
Most of the national reaction to the amendment has focused on legal and 
political issues relating to the ban on “Sharia Law.”  For some observers, 
passage of the amendment is a welcome development that strengthens 
similar efforts in other states.7  Other commentators worry that the 
amendment reflects “xenophobic hysteria,”8 “prey[s] upon the electorate’s 
post-9/11 fears and insecurities,”9 and, but for the actions of the federal 
courts, threatens to deny constitutional rights to Muslims in Oklahoma.10  I 
have no desire to praise the amendment, which is misguided for reasons 
that include but are not limited to its treatment of “Sharia Law.”  But 
neither am I interested in castigating Oklahoma voters as “insecure” or 
“hysterical”—although it seems clear to me that the arguments made in 
favor of the amendment focused on unsubstantiated accounts of the harms 
that Islamic law could cause—arguments that at the very least approached 
prejudice against Muslims and Islam.11  I also agree that the amendment 
raises serious Establishment and Free Exercise concerns.   
                                                                                                                 
 4. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 5. See Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, 
Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. Civ-10-1186-M). 
 6. See Robert Boczkiewicz, Judges Asks [sic] Why Oklahoma’s Law on Sharia Applies 
to Only One Religion, NEWSOK.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), http://newsok.com/judges-asks-why-
oklahomas-law-on-sharia-applies-to-only-one-religion/article/3603557. 
 7. See Guy Rodgers, Oklahoma Voters Overwhelmingly Say “No” to Sharia Law, 
ACT! FOR AMERICA (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/email-
archives/ 2149-oklahoma-voters-overwhelmingly-say-no-to-sharia-law-.  For discussion of 
similar efforts, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: 
Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320-21 (2011); Penny M. Venetis, 
The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like It, Which Bar 
State Courts from Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 8. Symeonides, supra note 7, at 321. 
 9. Venetis, supra note 7, at 3. 
 10. See, e.g., Muneer Awad v. Paul Ziriax, Oklahoma State Board of Elections et al., 
ACLU.ORG (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/muneer-awad-v-paul-
ziriax-oklahoma-state-board-elections-et-al. 
 11. One can, of course, be a believing Muslim without being particularly interested in 
Islamic law; however, I read the published comments of the amendment’s supporters as 
evidence of unease with and in some cases fear of Islam and Muslims.  These feelings of 
unease and fear, I would argue, are not very far from and can easily develop into prejudice.  
For a sustained argument that the focus of the amendment was to attack Islam, including 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/3
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Important as these topics are, the Save Our State Amendment raises a 
host of other issues.  In a later article that will also appear in the Oklahoma 
Law Review, I approach the amendment from a conflict of laws perspective, 
and I analyze its implications for choice of law and recognition of 
judgments in Oklahoma courts.12  This short essay, by contrast, focuses on 
two issues that relate to the pending appeal.  Both issues risk being 
overlooked amidst the understandable emphasis on the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause issues that are the subject of the district court’s 
opinion and the briefing on appeal. 
I. Are the Save Our State Amendment’s “Sharia Law” Provisions 
Severable from the Rest of the Amendment? 
On the merits, the plaintiff challenges only the amendment’s references 
to “Sharia Law” and relies only on the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses to support his challenge.  Yet the Save Our State Amendment 
consists almost exclusively of two choice of law catalogs: one of permitted 
sources of law for Oklahoma courts and one of forbidden sources.  “Sharia 
Law” appears twice in these lists, but most of the amendment’s provisions 
are not explicitly linked to those references.  The obvious question, then, is 
what to do with the rest of the amendment if the plaintiff is correct that the 
references to “Sharia Law” violate one or both of the religion clauses.  
Oklahoma law provides a presumption of severability for statutes.13  The 
presumption can be overcome only if (1) “the valid provisions or 
application of the act are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and 
so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume the 
Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the 
void one,” or (2) “the remaining valid provisions or applications of the act, 
standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in 
accordance with the legislative intent.”14 
In Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating, which 
involved a legislative referendum, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited the 
                                                                                                                 
quotations from many supporters of the amendment, see Brief of Amici Curiae the American 
Jewish Committee, et al. at 9-18, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. May 16, 2011). 
 12. See John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and the Conflict of 
Laws, 65 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2012).  A draft of this article is available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1893707. 
 13. 75 OKLA. STAT. § 11a(1) (2001). 
 14. Id.  For application of the statute, see Liddell v. Heavner, 180 P.3d 1191, 1202-03 
(Okla. 2008); Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day Sch., 163 P.3d 557, 565 (Okla. 2007) 
(“A cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not destory.”). 
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severability statute and held that “constitutional provisions are entitled to 
the same presumption of validity as legislative provisions.”15  Although the 
court determined that it did not need to conduct a severability analysis, it 
included an extensive quotation from a Florida Supreme Court opinion that 
did apply a severability analysis to a state constitutional amendment.16  
Thus, the best interpretation of Oklahoma law is probably that a severability 
analysis applies to the remaining portions of the amendment if the 
references to “Sharia Law” are invalid. 
Applying the two tests quoted above, the rest of the amendment appears 
to be severable from the “Sharia Law” provisions, at least as a textual 
matter.  Stripped of references to “Sharia Law,” the amendment still 
provides a catalog of permitted and forbidden sources of law that is 
“capable of being executed” by Oklahoma courts (although some items in 
the forbidden category raise additional constitutional issues).  Nor is the rest 
of the amendment—again, at least as a textual matter—“essentially and 
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon” the ban on “Sharia 
Law.”   
The best response to this analysis—and it is a significant response—is 
that the ban on “Sharia Law” was the central purpose of the amendment, the 
focus of the amendment’s drafters and proponents, and the issue to which 
the attention of voters was repeatedly directed.17  That is to say, without the 
“Sharia Law” language, there is at least some doubt whether the legislature 
would have bothered to adopt the referendum at all.18  This response, while 
powerful, sidesteps rather than answers the assertion that the rest of the 
amendment could go into effect without the “Sharia Law” language. 
Given the strong argument in favor of severability, why did the district 
court enjoin the entire amendment without conducting a severability 
                                                                                                                 
 15. 83 P.3d 835, 839 (Okla. 2003). 
 16. Id. at 840 (quoting Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1999)).  The three 
concurring justices in Local 514 would have held that the remaining portions of the 
referendum were severable.  Id. at 851 (Summers, J., concurring).  The court long has 
applied a severability analysis to proposed initiatives, although it has not always found that 
the remaining portions are severable, and it sometimes has stressed the presence of a 
severability clause.  See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No.358, 870 P.2d 782, 786-87 (Okla. 
1994); In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Okla. 1992); In re Initiative Petition 
No. 347, 813 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Okla. 1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 190, 207 P.2d 266 
(Okla. 1949). 
 17. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 9-18. 
 18. Note, however, that the Oklahoma House of Representatives passed a bill on March 
17, 2011 that would limit the ability of courts to rely on “foreign law,” although it does not 
go nearly as far as the Save Our State Amendment.  H.R. Res. 1552, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/3
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analysis?  One answer is that the state did not press the point in the district 
court.  Nor has it done so on appeal.19  A second answer turns on the nature 
of the relief that the plaintiff sought.  Because the plaintiff claimed that the 
very presence of the “Sharia Law” language in the Oklahoma constitution 
would harm him, he sought to prevent the language of the amendment from 
being incorporated into the constitution.  The way to do that, he asserted, 
was to prevent certification of the election results.20  
On the one hand, this form of relief may be necessary to address this 
specific harm to the plaintiff.  On the other hand, most of the amendment’s 
provisions do not harm the plaintiff’s rights under the religion clauses.  By 
granting the relief that the plaintiff sought, the district court allowed a facial 
challenge to one part of the amendment to prevent the entire amendment 
from going into effect, even though the rest of the amendment, while 
certainly open to as applied challenges on other grounds, was not 
vulnerable to a facial attack based on the religion clauses. 
For opponents of the entire amendment, this is certainly a felicitous 
result.  The district court’s embrace of this broad remedy would be more 
convincing, however, if it were accompanied by some explanation of how 
such a remedy is appropriate in light of plaintiff’s limited attack on the 
amendment.  The question now is what the Tenth Circuit should do if it 
agrees with the district court on the merits.  Should it also affirm a remedy 
that prevents the unchallenged portions of the amendment from going into 
effect?  Should it instead rewrite the amendment to remove the 
objectionable portions? 
The answer, I believe, is to certify these issues to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court.  The Local 514 case provides a precedent for this approach.  In that 
case, the Tenth Circuit was unsure what to do with the referendum once it 
had ruled on various preemption issues, so it certified two questions 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Perhaps the state’s lawyers have little interest in saving the remnants of a 
constitutional amendment that threatens to play havoc with Oklahoma choice of law 
doctrine. 
 20. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 12, 19.  The relationship between the claim for 
relief and the harms claimed by the plaintiff has standing implications.  Plaintiff’s claim that 
the presence of the amendment in the constitution would be an official condemnation of his 
faith clearly relates to the relief sought.  See id. ¶¶ 19-22.  But his claim that the amendment 
would be interpreted and applied to invalidate the provisions of his will that refer to Islamic 
law is not as close because, although preventing certification would certainly forestall 
adverse applications, it is also a remedy that is much broader than what is necessary to solve 
the probate problem.  See id. ¶¶ 24-28; cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form 
of relief sought.”). 
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concerning severability to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.21  Because the 
scope of the remedy in the Save Our State litigation turns so much on state 
law, the Tenth Circuit should do the same here.  It should ask the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, first, whether the remaining provisions of the amendment 
are severable and, second, if those provisions are severable, whether the 
unconstitutional language can be excised from the amendment before the 
amendment becomes part of the Oklahoma constitution, or whether the 
entire amendment must remain under injunction even if the remaining 
language is severable. 
II. What Does It Mean to Hold That “‘Sharia Law’ Lacks a Legal 
Character”? 
The district court’s opinion states that, at the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction, the plaintiff “presented testimony that ‘Sharia Law’ is not 
actually ‘law,’” “that the obligations that ‘Sharia Law’ imposes are not 
legal obligations but are obligations of a personal and private nature 
dictated by faith,” and “that ‘Sharia Law’ differs depending on the country 
in which the individual Muslim resides.”22  Based on this testimony, the 
court reached the following conclusion:  “the Court finds that plaintiff has 
shown ‘Sharia Law’ lacks a legal character, and, thus, plaintiff's religious 
traditions and faith are the only non-legal content subject to the judicial 
exclusion set forth in the amendment.”23  The court reiterated its finding in 
the next paragraph: “Sharia Law is not ‘law’ but is religious traditions that 
differ among Muslims.”24 
Oklahoma courts consult the text of the official ballot title when 
interpreting constitutional amendments.25  The ballot title for the Save Our 
State Amendment provides, “Sharia Law is Islamic law.  It is based on two 
principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”26  Thus, the 
district court’s finding of fact can be restated as a finding that Islamic law is 
not law.   
                                                                                                                 
 21. Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating, 358 F.3d 743, 755 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 22. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 
2009); Venetis, supra note 7, at 5. 
 26. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
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It is difficult to know what to make of this apparent finding of fact.27  
There is certainly a problem with the amendment’s reference to “Sharia 
Law.”  But the problem is not whether “Sharia Law” refers to “legal” or 
“religious” obligations.  Rather, it is the vagueness and incompleteness of 
the definition.  Even a schematic summary of standard scholarly accounts 
provides a much richer picture than the ballot title’s unadorned reference to 
“the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed”:  “Within Muslim discourse, 
sharῑ‛a designates the rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims, 
derived in principal from the Kur’ān and hadῑth.  In this sense, the word is 
closely associated with fikh, which signifies academic discussion of divine 
law”28 or, more simply, “jurisprudence.”  Fikh, in turn, has two primary 
components:  ijmā (consensus), and ijtihad (scholarly interpretation), of 
which one of the most common forms is qiyās (roughly, analogical 
reasoning).29  Further, because fikh—jurisprudence or “the interpretive 
activities of scholars”—“is in practice the only access to the law, the two 
words [Sharia and fikh] are sometimes used synonymously.”30   
But hadith scholarship, ijma, and ijtihad are not fixed concepts.  There 
are competing collections of hadith and different schools of thought among 
scholars on how to evaluate them and other sources of law, not to mention 
differences between Sunni and Shia approaches to the various materials and 
interpretive activities—all of which, of course, generates different rules for 
or solutions to various legal issues.31  Indeed, since at least the nineteenth 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Perhaps the most one can say with certainty is that this finding tends to prove the 
plaintiff’s point that the Save Our State Amendment’s references to “Sharia Law” violate the 
excessive entanglement prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971), because “in 
order to ‘not . . . consider Sharia Law’, a judge must consider Sharia Law to determine what 
is and what is not ‘Sharia Law.’”  Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 
2010) (No. Civ-10-1186). 
 28. 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION 321 (C.E. Bosworth et al., eds. 
1997) [hereinafter 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM].  A hadith is “an account of what the 
Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence.” 3 
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION 23 (B. Lewis et al., eds. 1986) [hereinafter 3 
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM]. 
 29. For discussion, see 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 28, at 1023, 1026; 
10 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION 930 (P.J. Bearman et al., eds. 2000); 2 THE 
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD 452 (John L. Esposito ed. 1995); 
see also RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHAR‛A) 288-89 (2011). 
 30. 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 28, at 322; see also THE OXFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 29, at 450. 
 31. 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 28, at 322-25; THE OXFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 29, at 450-53; see also BHALA, 
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century, national codes in several countries have purported to codify 
aspects of “Sharia,” even as the specific provisions of those codes differ 
from country to country.32  In short, despite the importance of the Quran 
and collections of hadith, Islamic law is not limited to these sources, and it 
is not a static, unitary, or unchanging tradition. 
Importantly, Islamic law is also not, as the district court described it, 
simply a set of “obligations of a personal and private nature dictated by 
faith.”33  The topics covered by Islamic law include, for example, 
commercial transactions, constitutional issues, and criminal law.34  Even 
more to the point, the Save Our State Amendment quite clearly addresses 
itself to sources of law that courts might be tempted to consider; it does not 
reach out to include rules that govern a person’s religious observances in 
circumstances that are outside the reach of American civil or criminal law.  
Thus, although the term “Sharia Law” is vague, the district court’s factual 
finding that it refers only to religious obligations and not to legal 
obligations is incorrect. 
Presumably, the plaintiff made this assertion, and the district court 
accepted it, to bolster the conclusion that the “Sharia Law” references 
violate the religion clauses.35  But even though Islamic law relates to both 
religious and legal obligations, the ban on “Sharia Law” remains 
objectionable as an attack on a specific religious tradition.  Put differently, 
the Tenth Circuit can affirm the conclusion that this part of the amendment 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 29, at 289-90. 
 32. THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 29, at 
455; see also 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 28, at 325. 
 33. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 
 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. Dec. 1, 2010). 
 34. For discussion of the wide range of topics, see BHALA, supra note 29.  Of the filings 
before the Tenth Circuit, the amicus brief filed by the Foundation for Moral Law comes the 
closest to articulating an adequate definition of Islamic law.  It argues that Islamic law “is, or 
at least can be, a legal system,” although it does so only in an effort to define the scope of 
the supposed threat that Islamic law poses.  Brief Amicus Curiae of Foundation for Moral 
Law on Behalf of Defendant-Appellants, in Support of Reversal at 15-18, Awad v. Ziriax, 
No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2011).  The brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York addresses the inadequacy and vagueness of the term “Sharia Law,” recognizes 
that Islamic law covers such things as commercial transactions, and stresses the diversity of 
Islamic law.  Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Submitted by the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Islamic Law Committee of the 
American Branch of the International Law Association at 19-21, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-
6273 (10th Cir. May 13, 2011). 
 35. Perhaps, too, plaintiff made this assertion about the character of Islamic law to 
counter claims that it poses a political threat.  
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is unconstitutional without upholding or relying upon the district court’s 
finding of fact. 
Not only should the Tenth Circuit avoid the factual finding that Islamic 
law “lacks a legal character,” it should repudiate that finding.  Although the 
court made its finding about Islamic law to support its ruling in favor of the 
constitutional rights of Muslims, the premises that underlie that finding also 
confirm the arguments of the amendment’s supporters.  Implicit in the 
district court’s finding is the idea that real law and legal obligations are 
secular and linked to territorial sovereignty; they are not religious and free-
floating.36  Those premises lead to a devaluation of “Sharia Law” relative to 
municipal law, precisely because “Sharia Law” varies from place to place 
and is more associated with the beliefs of individuals and a religious 
community than with the rules of a single discernable sovereign. 
Although supporters of the amendment and similar proposals in other 
states contend—contrary to the district court—that Islamic law “is, or at 
least can be, a legal system,”37 their rhetoric also assumes—consistent with 
the district court—that Islamic law is not bounded in space, that it travels 
with individual Muslims, and that it easily spreads across borders.  The only 
difference is the further insinuation by supporters of the amendment that 
these qualities make Islamic law similar to a virus or contagion.38   
Conclusion 
Just as the district court did not analyze the nature of the remedy that it 
approved, it also did not consider the implications of its finding that Islamic 
law is not law.  The Tenth Circuit should certify the question of remedy to 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and it should disavow the district court’s 
factual finding that Islamic law is not law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 36. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York presents the point more clearly 
than the district court when it asserts that “there has never been either a single authoritative 
compilation of Shari’a, or any judicial or legislative body with jurisdiction over anything 
remotely constituting even a majority of Muslims.”  Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 34, at 20.  But couldn’t one make roughly the same point 
about the common law for most of its history and for customary international law today?  
 37. Brief Amicus Curiae of Foundation for Moral Law, supra note 34, at 18. 
 38. For a useful analysis of similar rhetorical moves in Turkish political discourse, see 
Ruth A. Miller, Violence, Corruption and Neo-Imperialism:  The Centrality of Islamic Law 
in Turkish Political Discourse, 27 TURKISH STUD. ASS’N J. 53 (2003). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
